Digests • 06 November 2025
Monthly Energy Digest – October 2025
The power system situation changed dramatically in October compared to the previous month. During this time, Russian armed forces carried out widespread attacks on Ukraine’s power infrastructure. Some of these attacks resulted in long-lasting power shortages. The regions on the left bank of the Dnipro River were most affected. At the same time, transmission capacities remain insufficient to deliver electricity to the left bank.
By the end of the month, all nuclear power units were operational and connected to the grid. However, additional capacity did not resolve the shortage issue. Moreover, due to colder weather, electricity demand increased as the heating season started, but the centralized heat supply was delayed until the end of the month. By mid-October, power demand was approximately 20% higher than at the beginning of the month.
Higher power demand and Russian strikes affected international trade as well: exports dropped and import increased.
Ukraine restarted its cross-border electricity trade with Slovakia on October 29. This trade was halted from September 1 for repairs on the Velké Kapušany-Mukachevo line. According to the ENTSO-E Transparency Platform, Ukraine is now importing and exporting electricity with Slovakia. On October 29, Ukraine imported 1,110 MWh of electricity from Slovakia.
Electricity imports to Ukraine in October 2025 rose 2.5 times to 360 thousand MWh. Hungary maintains the largest share at 51%, with Poland in second place at 22%. Overall, electricity imports increased in all directions during October. Compared to October 2024, electricity imports to Ukraine doubled.
At the same time, electricity exports in October 2025 dropped by 85% due to increased shelling of energy infrastructure. In total, 90.8 thousand MWh of electricity were exported to EU countries and Moldova during the month.
By August 2025, NPC Ukrenergo had used up all the funds designated for paying electricity from private household solar power plants for the year. This accounts for the debts that emerged in August.
Over the eight months of 2025, private household solar power plants on the green tariff incurred electricity expenses totaling UAH 7.114 billion (excluding VAT). In comparison, Ukrenergo’s electricity transmission tariff structure allocated UAH 6.98 billion for this purpose throughout the year. Consequently, Ukrenergo does not have enough funding sources to cover the costs of services supplied by universal service providers (USPs) in 2025.
As of October 13, Ukrenergo has paid 30.36% of the agreed amount for August 2025, based on all USPs used for settlements with households’ PVs. The scheduled service fee for August is UAH 1.5 billion, but only UAH 455.26 million has been paid so far, which is nearly a third of the total. Ukrenergo is currently discussing with the regulator NEURC to identify sources of financing for the deficit expenses.
In 2024 and 2025, following blackouts after Russia strikes, companies and households ramped up installing solar power systems to at least partly protect themselves from potential supply shortages in the future. Not all households applied for feed-in tariffs. But even those who did caused financial shortages fro Ukrenergo to pay the amount.
On October 22, the Cabinet of Ministers decided that the tariff for consumers will stay the same until April 30, 2026 – 4.32 UAH per kWh. The public special obligations (PSO) mechanism for electricity has been extended until April 30, 2026, ensuring the tariff remains stable for households throughout the entire heating season.
On the other hand, predicting the future of the tariff is difficult. In the past, when the government decided to raise tariffs, it explained that it was necessary to address significant losses to the power system and to restore it after Russian attacks. Currently, it is unclear what additional damage might result from any new campaign if Russian strikes continue.
The transmission system operator NPC Ukrenergo proposes setting the transmission tariff for 2026 at UAH 823.77/MWh, which is 20% higher than the current year’s tariff. The transmission tariff for green metallurgy enterprises is proposed at UAH 467.83/MWh, 30% above the current tariff.
Last year, the energy regulator approved, for the first time, a power transmission tariff sufficient to prevent the creation of new debts for paying feed-in tariffs to RES producers. Every year, a proposal to review the tariff is followed by an informational campaign that includes misinformation from some actors, aimed at avoiding an increase in the tariff. Large power consumers are expected to oppose this decision and launch a public campaign to prevent a tariff increase. As mentioned above, Ukrenergo already lacks funds to pay renewable power producers, and approving a suitable tariff is crucial to avoid additional debts in the electricity market.
The National Commission for the Energy and Utilities of Ukraine proposes to set the electricity transmission tariff for 2026 at the level of 786.74 UAH/MWh, which is 14.6% higher than the current one. At the same time, for green metallurgy it is planned to set the transmission tariff at the level of 428.63 UAH/MWh (+19.2% compared to the current one).
UkrHydroEnergo has started operating as an aggregated group in the electricity market. This group includes producers, consumers, and electricity storage facilities that work together as a single virtual power plant managed by UkrHydroEnergo. The company acts on behalf of these entities in the electric energy market.
As an aggregator, UkrHydroEnergo takes full responsibility for activities related to the Ukrainian electricity market. Additionally, the company will oversee and coordinate all participants, ensuring the optimization of both production and consumption, which allows for buying and selling electricity at the most favorable prices. This will simplify market operation for small producers.
Before the end of October, the total volume of gas stored in underground storage facilities reached 13,2 billion cubic meters – exactly the amount that was planned to be stored before gas withdrawal from storage began. Previously, this volume was considered enough to get through the winter. Meanwhile, Russia renewed its attacks on gas production facilities. As domestic gas production decreased, additional volume needs to be imported to meet demand in winter and early spring.
On October 22, Ukraine ceased injecting natural gas into underground storage facilities (UGS) and began withdrawing gas.
In 2024, withdrawals started on November 4, and in 2023, they began on November 11. Despite this, the heating season in Ukraine—when gas is used to generate heat and a centralized supply is provided to customers—has not yet started. This means that as of October 22, gas consumption in Ukraine was lower than on the same dates when withdrawals began in 2023 and 2024. However, available gas resources—production and imports—were not sufficient to avoid using gas from UGS.
In 2024, Ukraine nearly stopped importing gas but resumed imports in 2025, including in October. These overall trends suggest a significant decline in domestic gas production due to Russian attacks.
Due to damage to gas-producing facilities caused by Russian strikes, Ukraine will need to import more gas to pass the winter. Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko said Ukraine needs around 2 billion euros to cover extra gas imports after Russia attacked Ukrainian gas-producing facilities in October. As planned, funds will be raised from domestic reserves and international partners, including financial institutions. Depending on EU prices, this amount may cover the import of 3.5-5 bcm of gas. CEO of Naftogaz, Serhiy Koretsky, stated that Ukraine will need just over 4 billion cubic meters of additional gas imports by the end of the 2025/2026 heating season to ensure its reliable supply.
Nearly half of the required amount to import gas has been secured by the end of October.
On October 10, Ukraine’s Cabinet of Ministers updated the regulations governing special obligations (PSO) for natural gas market participants, aiming to protect public interests in the natural gas sector. The PSO for supplying natural gas to household consumers, gas distribution system operators, the last resort supplier (GSC Naftogaz of Ukraine), and natural gas-fired electricity producers has been extended until March 31, 2026, including that date, instead of October 31, 2025, as previously specified in the earlier resolution.
The government has extended special obligations for JSC Ukrnafta to sell its natural gas to NJSC Naftogaz of Ukraine for resale to consumers under the PSO. Since April 2025, Ukrnafta has been selling all of its production, except for gas used for production and technological purposes, its own needs, electricity generation, LPG, and stable gasoline.
Ukrnafta must sell its natural gas to Naftogaz at a fixed rate of UAH 12,000 per thousand cubic meters (including VAT) until March 31, 2026. Similarly, UkrGazVydobuvannya and ChornomorNaftoGaz are required to sell all their resources to Naftogaz at a fixed price of UAH 7,420 per thousand cubic meters (including VAT).
For some reason, the government mandated LLC “GTS Operator of Ukraine” to purchase only imported natural gas. During this period, GTS is required to buy a total of 340 million cubic meters of imported resources.
Additionally, the government increased prices for natural gas supplied under the PSO to electricity producers that use natural gas.
Currently, a moratorium prevents raising natural gas prices for consumers until martial law is lifted, leading the government to extend current natural gas rates for households and other users. Previously, the government extended the existing regulated gas price for households.
The plant’s power supply was restored after repairs on the 750 kV Dniprovska line were finished. Work is currently ongoing on the 330 kV Ferosplavna line. For a month, the ZNPP relied solely on emergency diesel generators, which posed serious risks to nuclear and radiation safety. The outage was caused by shelling from Russian forces, who systematically damage the power lines connecting the ZNPP to Ukraine’s power grid. Since the full-scale invasion of the energy sector, power has been restored 42 times.
In October, Russia increased its air strikes against Ukraine by 30% in a month, with the primary targets being the energy infrastructure. For the first time since the large-scale invasion, Russia has heavily attacked electricity, gas, and fuel facilities all at once.
On October 10 and 22, Russian armed forces launched massive attacks on the Ukrainian power system, targeting energy facilities on the left bank of the country. On October 30, drones and missiles struck facilities in the western part of the country. Additionally, less severe attacks occurred on other dates.
Attacks on gas infrastructure took place on October 3, 5, 10, 12, 15, 16, and 28. Gas production and storage facilities were targeted. This fall, Russians have also been actively targeting combined heat and power plants, which provide centralized heating.
Besides, occasional attacks occurred on coal mines, coal enrichment facilities, fueling stations, and fuel depots.
The Minister of Energy, Svitlana Grynchuk, announced that Ukraine is exploring ways to complete the Khmelnitsky NPP without buying Russian-made equipment in Bulgaria.
In April, Bulgarian Deputy Prime Minister and leader of the Bulgarian Socialist Party, Atanas Zafirov, announced that the country would not sell two nuclear reactors from the Bulgarian Belene NPP to Ukraine. He emphasized that this is a collective decision, calling the reactors key for Bulgaria’s energy security and economic independence.
Ukraine’s government and Energoatom expected that those reactors would be used to construct the 3rd and 4th units at Khmelnitsky NPP.
Ukrainian experts have expressed concerns about purchasing and utilizing this equipment. First, these reactors are of Soviet/Russian design and have been stored in Bulgaria for years, likely not meeting modern nuclear safety requirements unless they have been updated. And that refers to the Russian Rosatom, which possesses the technology and can upgrade the equipment.
Ukraine presented a project to build an LNG terminal in Odessa to the White House and American energy companies during Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s visit to Washington, DC. This requires negotiations with Turkey to ensure that the Bosphorus Strait is open for this purpose.
Earlier, 15 years ago, Ukraine already planned to build an LNG terminal near Odessa. It was intended to include two phases: a floating regasification unit (FSRU) and a stationary land terminal, with a total capacity of about 15 billion cubic meters per year. Turkey was almost okay with this when Qatar approached Ankara to issue a permit.
The idea of building an LNG facility arose after 2014, but Naftogaz, led by Andrii Kobolev, did not support it.
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